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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
In this case raising a question of first impression in the 
federal courts, we are faced with an apparent conflict 
between "other insurance" provisions in two self-funded 
ERISA plans, each of which purports to provide at most 
secondary coverage to the same claimants. 
 
To resolve the conflict, the district court crafted a federal 
common law order of benefits determination rule that 
would impose primary liability on the fund whose 
participants are the employers of the claimants, in this case 
the Appellants. Appellants argue that the district court 
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erred by concluding that the two plans are not reconcilable 
on their terms, that the court should have adopted New 
Jersey state law as the appropriate rule of decision for 
resolving any apparent conflict between the plans, and that 








The Parties and Their Plans 
 
Appellants are the trustees of two self-funded welfare 
benefit plans of the United Food and Commercial Workers 
Local 1262 and Employers Welfare Fund and the U.F.C.W. 
Local 1262 and Employers Health and Welfare Fund 
(collectively "Local 1262 Funds"), which cover employees of 
several contributing employers in the supermarket 
industry. Appellee Teamsters Local 560 Trucking 
Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund (the "TENJ Fund") 
is also a self-funded welfare benefit plan that covers 
employees of participating supermarkets. The respective 
plans contain "other insurance" clauses, more particularly 
referred to as "coordination of benefits" clauses in the 
group health insurance industry, that set forth 
circumstances under which the plans will assume primary 
coverage liability for a claimant who is also covered by 
another plan. 
 
Group health care insurance plans have increasingly 
included coordination of benefits clauses because the 
enlarged number of two-employee families has increased 
the possibility that a claimant could be covered under more 
than one plan. By conditioning coverage on specified 
circumstances, the clauses seek to limit their costs and 
prevent a claimant from acquiring coverage from multiple 
plans in excess of the claimant's covered medical expenses. 
See Jack B. Helitzer, Coordination of Benefits: How and 
Why it Works, 4 Benefits L. J. 411, 412 (1991). 
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This dispute concerns the obligation of the plans to 
certain part-time supermarket employees who are covered 
under both plans. The Local 1262 Funds describe their 
coverage obligations to part-time employees under the 
heading, "Coordination of Benefits": 
 
If a Part-time Member who is a Covered Member . . . is 
also covered under one or more Other Plans, the 
Benefits payable under this Plan will be coordinated 
with Benefits payable under all Other Plans. When 
there is a basis for a claim under this Plan and the 
Other Plan, this Plan is a Reimbursement Plan which 
has its Benefits determined after those of such Other 
Plan. 
 
As this is a Reimbursement Plan for Part-time 
Members who are Covered Members . . . payments will 
be made after all other sources of coverage have been 
exhausted. 
 
App. at 89. 
 
The Local 1262 Funds' Summary Plan Description also 
states with respect to coverage for part-time employees: 
 
[T]his Plan is always a reimbursement plan; if you 
are covered under another medical plan, this Plan will 
only take effect when the limits of your other Plan have 
been exceeded. This means that, you can receive 
benefits from this Plan (in the form of reimbursement 
payments) only after the other plan pays benefits to the 
full extent of the terms of that Plan. 
 
App. at 143 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Local 1262 
Funds attempt to defer any medical payments for their 
part-time employees until after the employee has exhausted 
all other possible sources of coverage, and the Funds refer 
to this proviso alternatively as a "reimbursement clause," 
an "excess clause," or an "always secondary clause." 
 
The TENJ Fund, in an effort to avoid always being left 
with a claimant's bill, has a coordination of benefits 
provision that disclaims liability altogether for employees 
who are participants in a plan such as that of the Local 
1262 Funds. The TENJ Fund plan provides: 
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In determining whether this plan is primary for a 
spouse [or dependent] the following will apply: 
 
"The Plan covering the patient as an employee or in 
which the employee is a participant . . . will be the 
primary plan. If the primary plan denies coverage 
because of the application of a Rule which is unique to 
that Plan and which is not a rule of this Fund, then 
this Fund will provide only that coverage which it 
would have provided if the primary plan had granted 
primary coverage. 
 
This Fund does not afford coverage to a participant's 
dependent who herself/himself is a participant in a 
Reimbursement or similar plan that affords coverage 
only if there is no other health/welfare coverage." 
 
App. at 217 (emphasis in original). 
 
In an effort to further clarify the limits of its coverage, the 
TENJ Fund describes the following hypothetical: 
 
Mr. ABC is a participant under our Welfare Fund. His 
spouse works for the XYZ company. Under normal 
coordination of benefits, Mrs. ABC's medical claims are 
submitted to her company first. After they pay the 
claim, in accordance with their Plan, she submits the 
claim with a copy of the explanation of benefits from 
her Plan to our Fund showing the amount paid. Our 
Fund then pays our portion of the claim under the 
coordination of benefits rule as the secondary payor 
and pays the difference up to the Fund's allowable 
amount. However, if Mrs. ABC's XYZ Plan rejects her 
claim because XYZ says its Plan is a Reimbursement 
Plan and will not pay claims if there is any other 
coverage, such as her being covered as a dependent 
under her husband's plan, then our Fund will not pay 
any portion of Mrs. ABC's claim. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
In May 1993, Susan Armstrong, a part-time employee of 
Shop-Rite Supermarkets, a contributing employer to the 
Local 1262 Funds, submitted medical expense claims to the 
Local 1262 Funds in an aggregate amount of $243,993. 
Because Armstrong's father was a participant in the TENJ 
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Fund, she would ordinarily have also been eligible for 
secondary coverage as a dependent under the TENJ Fund 
plan. The Local 1262 Funds denied primary liability for 
Armstrong's claims on the ground that it was a 
reimbursement or excess plan only, and instead notified the 
TENJ Fund that it was primarily liable for paying 
Armstrong's expenses. In the following months, the Local 
1262 Funds received similar claims from Karen Iler, Esther 
Owens, and Patricia Kelly, all of whom were also part-time 
employees of contributing employers to the Local 1262 
Funds as well as dependents of participants of the TENJ 
Fund. The Local 1262 Funds similarly denied these claims 
and sent notification that the TENJ Fund bore primary 
responsibility. 
 
In response, the TENJ Fund likewise denied primary 
coverage liability for the four part-time employees' claims. It 
took the position that, because the Local 1262 Funds 
provided only a reimbursement plan for the part-time 
employees, it was relieved from any liability by the express 
terms of the TENJ Fund. In a letter dated June 4, 1993, the 
TENJ Fund informed the Local 1262 Funds that "Since 
TENJ does not cover Susan Armstrong, your fund provides 
sole coverage." App. at 154. 
 
In order to avoid undue hardship to the claimants 
throughout the period of time in which the two funds 
debated their respective liabilities, the Local 1262 Funds 
paid the claimants' benefits, without prejudice to their right 
to proceed against and seek reimbursement from the TENJ 
Fund. The TENJ Fund agreed to pay secondarily for the 
time being, but also "without prejudice to the rights of 




District Court Proceedings 
 
On October 26, 1994, the Local 1262 Funds filed an 
action in the district court in New Jersey seeking a 
declaration that the TENJ Fund was primarily liable on the 
contested claims and an order directing the TENJ Fund to 
reimburse them for money paid to claimants in their 
 
                                6 
assumed role as the primary provider. The Local 1262 
Funds argued that the provision of the TENJ Fund plan 
which disclaims liability entirely if a beneficiary is covered 
by an alternate reimbursement plan was an invalid "escape 
clause." They then contended that once the escape clause 
is read out of the TENJ Fund plan, the remaining terms of 
both plans assign primary liability to the TENJ Fund plan. 
In response, the TENJ Fund argued that its plan did not 
contain an escape clause and that, regardless, the Local 
1262 Funds plan was primarily responsible for the claims 
at issue according to its own coordination of benefits 
provision because the claimants are employees of 
participants of that plan. 
 
In a thoughtful opinion, the district court granted the 
TENJ Fund's motion for summary judgment. See McGurl v. 
Teamsters Local 560 Trucking Employees of New Jersey 
Welfare Fund, 925 F. Supp. 280 (D.N.J. 1996). The court 
agreed that the provision of the TENJ Fund purporting to 
deny any liability if a beneficiary is separately covered by a 
reimbursement plan is an escape clause and thus 
unenforceable. Id. at 286. The court then concluded that 
the TENJ Fund's remaining coordination of benefits 
provision and the excess clause in the Local 1262 Funds 
plan were "mutually repugnant" because both attempted to 
deny primary coverage to these claimants, and would 
provide secondary coverage only if the other accepted 
primary liability. Id. at 289. In rejecting the Local 1262 
Funds' suggestion that the remainder of the plans were still 
reconcilable in favor of the Local 1262 Funds, the court 
declined to apply the decision in Starks v. Hospital Serv. 
Plan of N.J., Inc., 182 N.J. Super. 342, 350 (1981), aff'd, 91 
N.J. 433 (1982), which held that an excess clause was 
secondary to an ordinary other insurance provision in an 
insurance contract. See McGurl, 925 F. Supp. at 288. 
 
The district court in this case found the two plans at 
issue to be irreconcilable and chose to create a uniform 
federal common law rule in order to resolve the issue of 
how to prioritize the payment of benefits between two self- 
funded ERISA plans which have mutually repugnant 
coordination of benefits provisions. Id. at 243. The court 
adopted an "employer first" rule, recommended by the 
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Model Regulations of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners ("NAIC"), which would impose primary 
liability for coverage on the plan which covers claimants as 
employees rather than as dependents. Id. The court also 
rejected the Local 1262 Funds' suggestion that the better 
federal common law rule would be to apportion liability on 
a pro-rata basis, reasoning that such a rule would provide 
an undesirable incentive for ERISA-regulated plans to 
include excess provisions. Id. at 292. 
 
The Local 1262 Funds appeal from the district court's 
order, and the TENJ Fund, although successful, cross- 
appeals to preserve its argument that the district court 
erred in determining that its plan contains an 




JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Both the Local 1262 Funds and the TENJ Fund are self- 
funded employee benefit plans, meaning that they do not 
purchase insurance policies in order to satisfy their 
obligations to pay for medical and disability benefits of their 
participants and they are, therefore, covered by the federal 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, § 1002(1). ERISA 
provides comprehensive regulation of employee benefit 
plans, §§ 1021-1031, §§ 1101-1114, and broadly preempts 
state laws that "relate to" such plans, § 1144(a). However, 
ERISA does not regulate the substantive terms of plans, see 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983), and 
makes no express mention about how to resolve conflicts 
between coordination of benefits clauses. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 because the case involved a dispute over the 
disbursement of payments under ERISA. See Northeast 
Dep't ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local 
Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 159, 166 (3d 
Cir. 1985). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and exercise plenary review over the district court's 
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grant of summary judgment. United States v. Capital Blue 




THE TENJ FUND'S ESCAPE CLAUSE 
 
We begin with approval of the district court's 
construction of the coordination of benefits provision in the 
TENJ Fund plan. Under that provision, "[t]he Plan covering 
the patient as employee . . . will be the primary plan," but 
if that dependent is an employee of a plan that attempts to 
provide only reimbursement coverage, the TENJ Fund will 
not provide any coverage to the dependant at all. App. at 
217 ("This Fund does not afford coverage to a participant's 
dependent who herself/himself is a participant in a 
Reimbursement or similar plan that affords coverage only if 
there is no other health/welfare coverage.") 
 
This latter provision is indeed an escape clause, which, 
as we have previously explained, is one which "provides for 
an outright exception to coverage if the insured is covered 
by another insurance policy." Northeast, 764 F.2d at 160. 
In Northeast, we recognized that both a well-developed body 
of state common law of insurance and the policies 
underlying ERISA are hostile to the inclusion of escape 
clauses in benefits plans because they undermine the 
reasonable expectations of a beneficiary who may have his 
or her coverage shifted to another insurer with less 
favorable terms. Id. at 162-63. Such clauses are 
particularly harsh because, 
 
[A] plan with an escape clause does not provide 
participants who receive less in benefits from the other 
plan with the opportunity to return to the first plan for 
the difference. As a result, a participant of a plan with 
an escape clause, who thinks that he is covered by that 
plan and who expects to recover medical expenses in 
accordance with the terms of that plan, automatically 
loses this coverage in the presence of another 
insurance plan, even if the benefits he is entitled to 
receive under the other plan are much less favorable 
than those of his own. 
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Id. at 163. We concluded that a decision by a plan's 
fiduciary to include an escape clause is "arbitrary and 
capricious" and thus unenforceable under ERISA's 
regulatory scheme. Id. 
 
As written, under the TENJ Fund plan, a dependent- 
beneficiary of the TENJ Fund, who is also an employee 
beneficiary of the Local 1262 Funds, and who would 
anticipate receiving secondary benefits from the TENJ 
Fund, will get nothing because the Local 1262 Funds are 
excess only. According to the analysis in Northeast, 
therefore, this provision in the TENJ Fund plan is an 
unenforceable escape clause. 
 
The TENJ Fund nevertheless argues that "in practice" it 
has not followed the categorical exclusions of the purported 
escape clause, but has treated it as a secondary liability 
provision once a competing plan abandons its 
reimbursement provision and assumes primary 
responsibility. That argument is unpersuasive. First, it is 
clear from the record that the TENJ Fund has expressed its 
right to categorically deny any payment obligations based 
on its escape clause, as it did in its June 4, 1993 letter to 
the Local 1262 Funds' manager. App. at 154. That the 
TENJ Fund did, in fact, pay secondarily in this case was 
merely a litigation convenience undertaken expressly 
"without prejudice to the rights of either party," app. at 413; 
it was not done as a modification or amendment of the 
language of its plan. 
 
Second, interpretation of self-funded plans cannot 
depend on the unilateral understanding or ad hoc 
application by the plan, lest the comprehensibility, 
predictability, and assurance that ERISA intends to provide 
be lost. See, e.g., Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 
F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 108 
(1993). Finally, when we were presented with a similar 
categorical/as-applied distinction in Northeast, we expressly 
chose a remedy of "total invalidation of escape clauses" and 
"put the onus on trustees of plans with escape clauses to 
rewrite the plans." 764 F.2d at 164 n.17. Thus, only by 
express revision can the TENJ Fund transform the escape 
clause into a secondary liability clause, should it so choose. 
 
                                10 
IV. 
 
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TERMS OF THE PLANS 
 
Once the district court found the TENJ Fund plan's 
escape clause unenforceable, it proceeded to examine 
whether, if the escape clause were read out of the TENJ 
Fund plan, the two plans were reconcilable or, in other 
words, if the plans themselves could still provide a coherent 
order of benefits scheme. The TENJ Fund plan, as redacted, 
would read: "The Plan covering the patient as an employee 
or in which the employee is a participant . . . will be the 
primary plan," and thus would deny primary coverage if a 
claimant is an employee of a participant in another plan. 
The Local 1262 Funds plan denies primary coverage to 
their participants' part-time employees when those 
employees are in any way covered by another plan. The 
district court held the plans to be "mutually repugnant" 
because "[b]oth deny primary coverage and are willing to 
provide benefits in a secondary capacity only after the other 
accepts the responsibility of primary coverage." McGurl, 925 
F. Supp. at 287. 
 
The Local 1262 Funds urged the district court to apply 
the analysis of Starks, 182 N.J. Super. 342 (1981). In 
Starks, individual claimants were employee-beneficiaries of 
the Amalgamated Welfare Fund and were also covered by 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, an insurer, as dependents of 
beneficiaries. The Amalgamated Fund plan was similar to 
that of the Local 1262 Funds in that it would only provide 
reimbursement or "always excess" benefits after a claimant 
exhausted coverage from another plan. The Blue Cross/ 
Blue Shield plan contained a coordination of benefits 
provision under which it would be secondary to a plan that 
covered one of its member's dependents as a direct 
beneficiary. Id. The Starks court held that Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield was primarily liable, reasoning that the Blue Cross/ 
Blue Shield plan contemplated being primarily liable in 
some instances, i.e., where the claimant is an employee, 
but the Amalgamated Fund plan never contemplated being 
primarily liable vis-a-vis another plan. Therefore, the two 
plans could be ranked hierarchically. Id. at 350. 
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The Starks court concluded that the Amalgamated Fund's 
trustees contemplated a "tertiary" role when competing 
against any other secondary coverage provider, and stated 
that "[w]here the two coverages are not, however, primary 
and secondary but rather secondary and tertiary, there 
being no primary coverage in the usual sense, the only 
rational result is to require the secondary coverage to pay 
first and the tertiary to pay second." Id. at 353-54. Despite 
the rather complex reasoning, the essence of Starks' 
ultimate holding was that the plans at issue "d[id] not 
support the predicate of mutual repugnancy." Id. at 353. 
 
The district court declined to follow Starks based on its 
authority derived from ERISA's broadly worded preemption 
provision to categorically ignore state rules of decision that 
relate to the regulation of self-funded plans. See PM Group 
Life Ins. Co. v. Western Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 
543, 546 (9th Cir. 1992). In so ruling, the court also 
expressed its disagreement with the logic applied by the 
Starks court. 
 
The Local 1262 Funds argue that we should construe the 
two plans as the Starks court did, and interpret their plan 
as secondary to the TENJ Fund plan's coordination of 
benefits provision on the ground that the TENJ Fund plan 
(like the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan) recognizes certain 
situations in which it could be primarily liable, whereas the 
Local 1262 Funds plan is always secondary. We do not 
agree. 
 
First, it is not helpful to speak in terms of secondary and 
tertiary, and indeed it is somewhat misleading. The Starks 
court ranked the plans in this manner to emphasize that 
neither of the plans before it accepted primary liability and 
it was thus forced to rank the payment obligations of a plan 
that it construed as providing some coverage, albeit 
secondary, and a plan that was always excess, which it 
denominated as "tertiary". However denominated, the task 
required in this case is to determine which Fund's plan is 
primary. It would be arbitrary to adopt the Local 1262 
Funds' suggestion that because the TENJ Fund concedes 
primary liability in the situation of another plan's 
beneficiary but who is an employee of its participant, it 
must always be primary vis-a-vis Local 1262 Funds' always 
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excess clause. In fact, the TENJ Fund plan flatly denies 
primary coverage when presented with a claim of a 
dependant-beneficiary such as Susan Armstrong's. The 
mere fact that in other circumstances the TENJ Fund 
would be primary does not obviate the inescapable fact that 
it is not primary in the circumstances here. However the 
Starks court chose to interpret the language of the Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield plan before it, we cannot fairly ignore 
the certain, evident conflict from the faces of the two plans. 
 
Second, there would be substantial and adverse fiscal 
consequences were a court to impose primary coverage on 
a plan, such as that of the TENJ Fund, which intended to 
provide the nominal, secondary coverage for this group of 
claimants merely because the plan provides primary 
coverage for certain other claimants. As the district court 
recognized, "a court cannot deem one plan primary without 
shifting unanticipated costs to that plan and frustrating the 
intent of its trustees." McGurl, 925 F.Supp. at 289. 
 
The Local 1262 Funds argue that the district court erred 
in failing to follow what they claim is the majority view that 
entitles a plan that describes itself as a pure excess plan to 
pay secondarily because its coverage is not implicated until 
another policy's limits have been exhausted. See Insurance 
Co. of N. America v. Continental Cas. Co., 575 F.2d 1070, 
1071 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[s]ince [an excess clause] does not 
provide that supplemental protection until the other policy 
has been exhausted, it is `excess' to the other coverage"); 
Institute for Shipboard Educ. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co., 
22 F.3d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1994) (excess plan " `kicks in' to 
provide additional coverage once the policy limits of other 
available insurance are exhausted"). They argue based on 
these cases that their excess clause exempts their plan 
from any coordination of benefits with other plans, so that 
their coverage will "kick in" only after any other plan's 
coverage is depleted. 
 
As the TENJ Fund points out, the concept of "excess 
insurance" typically applies to casualty insurance policies 
which cover a single party for a single risk. See, e.g., Couch 
on Insurance 2d §§ 62.48-49. The cases cited by the Local 
1262 Funds fall within that category. These "pure" excess 
policies, which are also commonly referred to as "umbrella" 
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policies, are contingent on the existence of another, primary 
policy, and are intended to provide a separate, additional 
layer of coverage, never primary coverage. An insured will 
purchase this separate layer typically at a discounted price 
because it "will pick up where primary coverages end in 
order to provide extended protection." Occidental Fire and 
Cas. Co. of North Carolina v. Brocious, 772 F.2d 47, 53 (3d 
Cir. 1985). Since such layered policies are "not an attempt 
by a primary insurer to limit a portion of its risk by 
labelling it `excess' nor a device to escape responsibility, 
they are regarded as a `true excess over and above any type 
of primary coverage, excess provisions arising in regular 
policies in any manner, or escape clauses.' " Id. (quoting 8A 
J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4909.85 at 
453-54 (1981)). Rates for excess insurance are set"after 
giving due consideration to known existing and underlying 
basic or primary policies". 46 C.J.S. Insurance Law § 1138. 
Such policies are categorically separate and do not attempt 
to coordinate with other policies. 
 
The TENJ Fund argues that pure excess coverage as 
applied in casualty insurance cannot apply to group health 
plans covering numerous persons where duplicate, 
overlapping coverage is often likely.1  Coordination of 
benefits rules have evolved to cover these circumstances 
and are routinely followed. 
 
We need not resolve the parties' disagreement as to 
whether it is theoretically possible or desirable to have pure 
excess coverage in the group health care context. The 
relevant portions of both plans' terms are in fact 
coordination of benefits clauses because both represent a 
method for determining how and when two plans may be 
responsible for covering a common beneficiary. In this case, 
where the claimants are dependent-beneficiaries of the 
TENJ Fund plan and part-time employee-participants in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. One, if not the only, example of a pure excess policy in the health care 
context referred to by either party is a Medigap policy, a privately issued 
health insurance contract which supplements Medicare by covering 
expenses not covered by the federal government, such as deductibles or 
coinsurance amounts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(g)(1) (1992); United States 
v. Capital Blue Cross, 992 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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Local 1262 Funds plan, each of the plans views itself as 
"excess" or "secondary" and each looks to the other as 
primary. Thus, both plans attempt to coordinate benefits 
with potentially competing plans. 
 
The very terms of the Local 1262 Funds plan manifest an 
intent to coordinate benefits with other competing welfare 
plans. Under the heading "Coordination of Benefits," the 
Local 1262 Funds plan states that: "If a Part-time Member 
who is a Covered Member . . . is also covered under one or 
more Other Plans, the Benefits payable under this Plan will 
be coordinated with Benefits payable under all Other Plans." 
App. at 89 (emphasis added). 
 
Moreover, unlike the prototypical pure excess or umbrella 
policy, the Local 1262 Funds plan itself contemplates 
assuming primary liability in instances where there is no 
other coverage available, and thus no other plan with which 
to coordinate benefits. The plan's Summary Plan 
Description states: 
 
This Plan has a coordination of benefits provision for 
both Full-time and Part-time members. In most 
instances, this means that if your covered dependents 
are covered primarily under another medical plan, they 
can also receive benefits . . . from this Plan, up to the 
amount this Plan would have paid as your primary 
plan, but only after they receive reimbursement from 
the other Plan. . . . The benefits you receive from this 
Plan cannot exceed the amount this Plan would have 
paid if it was your primary plan. 
 
App. at 142-43 (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, we agree with the TENJ Fund that the Local 1262 
Funds plan's "so called `always excess' provision is no more 
than a subtle attempt to impose coordination of benefits 
using a biased order of benefits determination rule." Brief of 
Appellee at 27. In sum, the disputed reimbursement 
provision in the Local 1262 Funds plan is essentially a 
coordination of benefits provision, and, therefore, does not 
have a categorically secondary status to every plan with 
which it comes in conflict. In this case, the coordination of 
benefits provisions are "mutually repugnant," forcing the 
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Federal Common Law 
 
Because the plain terms of the individual plans would 
not resolve the conflict, the district court exercised its 
authority to devise federal common law, and settled on the 
"employer first" rule suggested by the National Association 
of Insurance Carriers ("NAIC"). See McGurl, 925 F. Supp. at 
293. Before examining the merits of the district court's 
selection, we consider the Local 1262 Funds' objections to 
the courts' federal common law-making authority to impose 
a rule of decision independent of state law. 
 
Federal common law refers to the development of legally 
binding federal rules articulated by a federal court which 
cannot be easily found on the face of a constitutional or 
statutory provision.  See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking 
Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev. 263, 267 
(1992); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law 
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1985) 
(" `Federal common law' . . . means any federal rule of 
decision that is not mandated on the face of some 
authoritative federal text -- whether or not that rule can be 
described as the product of `interpretation' in either a 
conventional or unconventional sense."). Notwithstanding 
the decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), which curtailed development of general federal 
common law, the power of federal courts to craft federal 
rules of decision is established in cases in which a federal 
common law rule is "necessary to protect uniquely federal 
interests," Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398, 426 (1964), such as federal proprietary interests, 
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federal interests in international law and to resolve conflicts 
among the states, or where "Congress has given the courts 
the power to develop substantive law," Texas Indus., Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). 
 
The Court has recognized that while at times state law 
would be appropriate, "[t]he desirability of a uniform rule is 
plain" where "identical transactions subject to the vagaries 
of the laws of the several states" would lead to great 
diversity in results.  Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 
318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). This would be true not only 
when the issue involves the rights and duties of the United 
States, as it did in Clearfield Trust, but also when a federal 
statute encompasses a broad mandate that requires 
uniform rules to effectuate the congressional purpose. See, 
e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of 
Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (upholding federal 
jurisdiction for labor-management disputes because of 
congressional authorization to develop federal common law 
pursuant to the LMRA); National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (in enacting 
Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress made "perfectly clear that 
it expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad 
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition"). 
 
Justice Jackson, in his famous concurrence in D'Oench, 
Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942), noted 
that the need to make common law stems from the inability 
of legislators to anticipate every possible contingency and 
the impracticability of judges returning all unanswered 
questions to the legislature. He stated, "Were we bereft of 
the common law, our federal system would be impotent. 
This follows from the recognized futility of attempting all- 
complete statutory codes, and is apparent from the terms of 
the Constitution itself." Id. Justice Jackson explained 
further that, "Federal common law implements the federal 
Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by them. 
Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the 
traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw 
upon all the sources of the common law." Id. at 472 (citing 
Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350 
(1939)). 
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Relevant to the determination whether to adopt a federal 
rule in this case is the scope of the ERISA preemption 
provision which states that the provisions of ERISA "shall 
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."2 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(a). That provision, "conspicuous for its breadth," 
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990), was drafted 
expansively in order to establish pension and welfare 
benefits "as exclusively a federal concern," Alessi v. 
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981), and 
to relieve plans of the burden of adhering to diverse state 
regulations. 
 
Thus, by preempting any law that even relates to ERISA 
plans Congress anticipated the development of a "federal 
common law of rights and obligations under ERISA- 
regulated plans." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 
56 (1987). As one court aptly stated, "[w]here state law is 
preempted and no specific federal provision governs, a 
court is forced to make law or leave a void where neither 
state nor federal law applies. In such a situation it is a 
reasonable inference that Congress intended some law, and 
therefore federal law, to apply." Wayne Chemical Inc. v. 
Columbia Agency Serv. Corp., 436 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D. 
Ill.) (internal quotations omitted), aff'd on other grounds, 
567 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Fox Valley & Vicinity 
Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 281 
(7th Cir.) (en banc)("When ERISA is silent on an issue, a 
federal court must fashion federal common law to govern 
ERISA suits."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 820 (1990). 
 
Therefore, although a federal court has the discretion to 
adopt state law as part of a federal rule of decision in order 
to resolve ERISA-related disputes, see Clearfield Trust, 318 
U.S. at 367, a federal court certainly has the power 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The "savings clause," as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), exempts 
from ERISA's preemption provision state laws regulating insurance, 
except for those regulations covered by the "deemer clause." The deemer 
clause, in turn, forbids states from deeming employee benefit plans "to 
be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the 
business of insurance," and thereby relieves the plan from state laws 
"purporting to regulate insurance." 29 U.S.C.§ 1144(b)(2)(B). See FMC 
Corp., 498 U.S. at 58. 
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pursuant to ERISA to reject any state rules, particularly a 
non-legislative rule such as that promulgated in Starks, 
which do not complement ERISA's policy goals. As we 
stated in Northeast, "judge-made rules regarding 
interpretation of insurance contracts are not the kind of 
state insurance regulations that the Congress intended to 
preserve."  764 F.2d at 158 n.8. 
 
The Local 1262 Funds argue that a uniform coordination 
of benefits rule sacrifices an important pursuit of intrastate 
uniformity for an overstated goal of interstate uniformity. 
Specifically, they contend that because state law governs 
coordination of benefits disputes for non-ERISA regulated 
plans, the plans will face the risk of different outcomes 
depending upon whether the competing plan is regulated 
by ERISA or not. By way of example they cite the 
unpublished opinion in Zalkin v. Teamsters Local 469 
Welfare Fund, No. 92-477 (D.N.J. 1993), which held that 
under New Jersey order of benefits determination rules the 
Local 1262 Funds plan, which was an excess plan, would 
not be primarily liable for an employee-participant of its 
plan vis-a-vis a non-ERISA regulated plan. 
 
ERISA's statutory mandate is to impose uniformity and 
predictability for the administration of self-insured plans so 
that beneficiaries can be guaranteed their expected benefits 
and so that administrators are not subject to " `conflicting 
or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee 
benefit plans.' " Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 
99 (1983) (quoting remarks of Senator Williams, 120 Cong. 
Rec. 29933 (1974)); see also FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 60; 
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56. 
 
It is not difficult to foresee the complications and 
"considerable inefficiencies" that would arise from having a 
"patchwork scheme" of differing state coordination of 
benefits rules. See Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 
482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987); Keystone Chapter, Associated 
Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 954 
(3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1032 (1995). See 
generally Helitzer, Coordination of Benefits at 411-15. For 
example, an ERISA-regulated plan may cover thousands of 
participants, some of them residing in jurisdictions that 
follow NAIC order of benefits determination rules and some 
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residing in jurisdictions that do not. That plan's obligation 
to assume primary liability for a claimant would depend on 
the fortuity of a claimant's place of residence and 
application of that state's coordination of benefits law, a 
consequence clearly disfavored by ERISA. See Alessi, 451 
U.S. at 523-26 (ERISA preempts state statute that would 
force employer to adopt different payment formulae for 
employees inside and outside state). As stated by the Ninth 
Circuit in PM Group, such indeterminacy and conflict 
"would almost certainly lead to litigation, thereby burdening 
the insured employees, the providers of covered services, 
and the plans themselves as well as the federal courts. 
Adoption of a uniform federal rule avoids such confusion 
and expense, and thus best serves the purposes of ERISA." 
953 F.2d at 547; see also FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 59 ("To 
require plan providers to design their programs in an 
environment of differing state regulations would complicate 
the administration of nationwide plans, producing 
inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased 
benefits"). 
 
Contrary to the Local 1262 Funds' suggestion, there are 
very few instances in which the federal common law is 
concerned with promoting uniformity within a state. This is 
not a situation analogous to those where the Court has 
approved adoption of a state's law when the federal statute 
incorporates a matter which is one primarily of state 
concern. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 
(1956)(instructing federal courts to defer to state law for 
meaning of terms like "children" and "widower" in the 
relevant portions of the federal Copyright Act rather than 
formulate a federal law of domestic relations); 
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 
209-10 (1946) (definition of "real property" which Congress 
authorized to be taxed should be defined by settled state 
rules, because Congress obviously contemplated various 
results among the states). 
 
There is no evidence that state commercial or other 
domestic interests would be upset by imposition of uniform 
federal order of benefits determination rules. In fact, New 
Jersey law regulating "other insurance" provisions is similar 
to the NAIC Model Regulation in all major respects except 
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that it does not provide the complying plan with the right 
to sue the noncomplying plan for subrogation. See N.J. 
Admin. Code tit. 11, § 4-28.9. Nevertheless, because of 
preemption the possibility that the Local 1262 Funds plan 
will face a different rule, and thus disuniformity within the 
state, when it conflicts with a non-ERISA insured plan, is 
of little concern under ERISA. Cf. Keystone, 37 F.3d at 959 
n. 19 ("While state regulations may affect the cost of doing 
business in a state, they may not, consistent with ERISA, 
place administrative burdens and costs on ERISA plans 
that make it impractical for an employer to provide a 
nationwide plan."). 
 
We thus conclude that Congress envisioned 
establishment by the federal courts of a uniform set of 
federal rules rather than subjecting to diverse state laws 
ERISA-regulated plans involving competing benefits 
clauses. See PM Group, 953 F.2d at 547; Northeast, 764 




Selection of the "Employer First" Rule 
 
As we have stated, the district court exercised its 
common law-making authority to select the "employer first" 
rule advocated by NAIC as the method for determining 
which competing ERISA plan should pay the claimed 
benefits. In 1970, in order to deal with the increasing 
problem of duplicate coverage, NAIC, an independent group 
of state insurance regulatory commissioners, promulgated a 
set of rules under the heading of Group Coordination of 
Benefits Model Regulation ("Model Regulation"), based in 
large part on rules that had been established and followed 
by the group insurance industry in the previous decade. 
See Helitzer, Coordination of Benefits, at 413-14. The Model 
Regulation contains a recommended order of benefits 
scheme covering potential conflicts among health benefit 
plans or policies. NAIC recommendations do not have the 
force of law, but many states have incorporated part or all 
of particular recommendations into their insurance 
statutes. 
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Jack Helitzer, who was the former chairman of the 
Industry Advisory Committee to the NAIC Task Force on 
Coordination of Benefits, attributes the widespread 
acceptance of the recommended regulation to the 
participants' need for absolute uniformity in this area. "The 
validity of the [coordination of benefits] rules is established 
not by law or regulation, but rather by the fact that there 
will be chaos without uniform rules to determine the order 
of benefit payment." Id. at 412. 
 
The sequential system for determining the order of 
payment by benefit plans in the comprehensive Model 
Regulation provides, as relevant here, that the"benefits of 
the plan which covers the person as an employee, member 
or subscriber (that is, other than as a dependent) are 
determined before those of the plan which covers the 
person as a dependent." Model Regulation § 5B(1) (quoted 
in Helitzer, Coordination of Benefits, at 414). As Helitzer 
explains, "[t]he plan covering the person as an employee 
pays benefits first. The plan covering the same person as a 
dependent pays benefits second." Helitzer, Coordination of 
Benefits, at 415. 
 
The Model Regulation does not recognize excess or 
always secondary plans or incorporate them into the order 
of benefits scheme because such clauses "will doom at least 
some of their employees to a double-secondary situation, in 
which the individual has double coverage and neither plan 
has the obligation to pay anything substantial. 
Responsibility for the resulting problem lies with the 
employer or plan that adopts a unique order of benefits 
determination rule, and not with the one who follows 
accepted practices." Id. at 421-22. 
 
If the excess plan refuses to pay for primary coverage, 
when it would be obligated to pay as primary under the 
Model Regulation, the plan that would be secondary is 
instructed to advance to the claimant the amount it would 
have paid as primary and execute a right of subrogation 
against the noncomplying plan. Model Regulation § 7(B). 
 
The NAIC approach to conflicts involving always excess 
coordination of benefits provisions has garnered widespread 
acceptance among the states. Twenty-four states have 
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adopted the NAIC order of benefits determination rules in 
full, providing a right to subrogation against noncomplying 
plans. Jack B. Helitzer, State Developments in Employee 
Benefits: State Adoption of Coordination of Benefits Rules,4 
Benefits L. J. 435, 442-43 (1991). Fifteen states, including 
New Jersey, have adopted the NAIC order of benefits 
scheme but, unlike the other twenty-four states, they do 
not incorporate the subrogation rule as a vehicle whereby 
a complying plan can compel payment from a 
noncomplying plan.3 Id. at 443. 
 
In deciding to adopt the NAIC recommended "employer 
first" rule, the district court explained that the NAIC rule 
would provide a uniform coordination of benefits scheme 
and thereby would best further the statutory objectives of 
ERISA. McGurl, 925 F. Supp. at 293. The Local 1262 Funds 
urge us to overturn that decision in favor of a pro-rata rule 
pursuant to which the two plans would divide coverage on 
an equal basis. They contend the pro-rata rule is more 
equitable and is the rule applied in the majority of federal 
and state courts. They cite our opinion in Northeast, where 
we noted that other courts faced with incompatible other 
insurance clauses have chosen the pro-rata formulation. 
764 F.2d at 161 n. 13. In fact, the majority of states have 
not adopted the pro-rata rule for health benefit plans, such 
as those covered by ERISA. And in Northeast we did not 
consider the merits of the pro-rata rule and thus the 
statement on which the Local 1262 Funds rely was merely 
dictum which is not binding upon our consideration here. 
 
The two courts of appeals that have considered whether 
to apply the pro-rata rule, albeit under somewhat different 
circumstances than those presented here, have divided on 
its merits. In Winstead v. Indiana Ins. Co., 855 F.2d 430, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See N.J. Admin. Code tit. 11, § 4-28.9(a)(1)(ii)(1995). 
 
If the complying plan is the secondary plan, it shall attempt to 
coordinate in the secondary position with benefits available through 
the noncomplying plan. The complying plan shall attempt to secure 
the necessary information from the noncomplying plan. If the 
noncomplying plan is unwilling to act as primary plan . . .the 
complying plan shall assume the primary position and pay its 
benefits as the primary plan. 
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432 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989), the 
Seventh Circuit considered a conflict between the 
coordination of benefits clauses in a claimant's ERISA- 
regulated health and welfare fund and an applicable no- 
fault automobile insurance policy regulated by Michigan 
law. After finding the plan and the policy to be 
irreconcilable, the court affirmed the district court's 
decision to hold both insurers liable on a pro-rata basis, 
citing our dictum in Northeast. Id. at 434. 
 
More recently, in Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Thorn Apple 
Valley, Inc., 31 F.3d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 1184 (1995), the Sixth Circuit rejected the 
application of a pro-rata liability rule between an ERISA 
plan and an insurance policy nearly identical to those 
considered in Winstead. The court concluded that in light 
of ERISA's broad preemption provision, the ERISA- 
regulated plan's diversion of liability should be given 
priority over the state plan's attempt to do the same. Id. at 
374. The court reasoned that although the pro-rata rule 
may be equitable in the context of two non-regulated, 
private plans, the equal apportionment formula would not 
"comply with a primary goal of ERISA, which is to 
safeguard the financial integrity of qualified plans by 
shielding them from unanticipated claims." Id. at 375. 
 
Of course, neither case is apposite here because those 
courts were not presented with conflicts in "other 
insurance" clauses in which both plans are regulated by 
ERISA. However, in rejecting the pro-rata rule, the court in 
Auto Owners gave dispositive weight to the policy 
considerations underlying ERISA, a principal consideration 
in the district court's selection here. 
 
In PM Group, 953 F.2d at 547-48, the Ninth Circuit, 
faced with incompatible "other insurance" provisions in two 
self-funded ERISA plans, relied in part on NAIC regulations 
to create a uniform federal common law solution. In that 
case, a husband and wife were each covered primarily by 
their respective plans for hospital expenses related to the 
premature birth of their daughter. The father's plan 
provided that, in all cases, the father's plan would be the 
primary insurer (the "gender rule") while the mother's plan 
provided that the plan covering the parent whose birthday 
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fell earlier in the year -- in this case, the mother's -- was 
the primary plan (the "birthday rule"). Id. at 548. 
 
The court recognized that ERISA was silent on the issue 
of conflicting "other insurance" provisions and decided that 
it must craft a common law rule that would take account 
of ERISA's stated goal of uniformity. Id. at 547 ("uniformity 
enables employers `to predict the legality of proposed 
actions without the necessity of reference to varying state 
laws' " (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56)). The court then 
looked for guidance to the NAIC Model Regulation, which 
provided an order of benefits rule for such a scenario, and 
adopted the "birthday rule" for resolving all such conflicts 
in ERISA-regulated plans.4 Id. 
 
The district court reasoned that adoption of a pro-rata 
rule would have the effect of encouraging welfare plans to 
adopt excess clauses in order to avoid the disadvantage, 
vis-a-vis a plan with excess or always secondary 
reimbursement provisions, of having to assume primary 
liability if the claimant is an employee of a plan participant, 
and 50% liability if the claimant were not an employee. 
McGurl, 925 F. Supp. at 293. By contrast, the excess or 
always secondary plans would never have to assume more 
than 50% liability. An excess or always secondary plan will 
invariably save money by reducing the plan sponsor's cost 
of providing health care coverage to their employees. 
 
The district court concluded that this incentive would 
produce a "race to the bottom" in the context of 
reimbursement provisions. Id.; see also Helitzer, 
Coordination of Benefits, at 421 ("If any plan can be free to 
set its own rules to determine the order of benefits, every 
other similarly situated plan should also be free to do the 
same. When other plans are affected by such a cost shift, 
they would have to be encouraged to adopt similar, always- 
secondary approaches causing large scale chaos"). In a 
regime where all plans have always excess provisions but 
no governing uniform coordination of benefits rule, 
resolution of a particular conflict between two such plans 
would depend on an ad hoc judicial determination. This 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The competing "gender rule" had been dropped by most states and 
NAIC as discriminatory. 
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would jeopardize the predictability and certainty for plan 
sponsors and beneficiaries that was central to ERISA's 
enactment. See Auto Owners, 31 F.3d at 375; Northeast, 
764 F.2d at 163. 
 
As we acknowledged in Northeast, 
 
even a qualified endorsement of escape clauses might 
encourage benefit plans with excess or coordination of 
benefits clauses to replace such clauses with those of 
the escape variety in order to "fight fire with fire." A 
war between plans would cause uncertainty in the 
industry and could potentially catch participants and 
beneficiaries in the crossfire. 
 
764 F.2d at 164 n.17. It is also of some interest that health 
care insurance contracts subject to New Jersey regulation 
are not permitted to include always secondary provisions. 
N.J. Admin. Code tit. 11, § 4-28.5(b). 
 
We are concerned that adoption of the pro-rata rule 
which the Local 1262 Funds propose would present some 
serious difficulties when two self-insured ERISA plans cover 
a family member as an employee-participant and dependent 
respectively. In the first place, it is unclear how the rule 
would operate in practice. Although a pro-rata rule may 
technically encompass proportional payment rather than 
the 50-50 payment the Local 1262 Funds suggested here, 
the Funds were unable to explain precisely how 
proportional payment would be fixed. Benefit plans are 
unlike casualty insurance, which is the field in which pro- 
rata payments primarily operate. There has been no 
satisfactory explanation of its feasibility in the medical 
benefits field, where different plans have different 
deductibles and coverages. Its operation under managed 
care programs is also uncertain. Counsel conceded at oral 
argument that calculation of the final benefit allocation 
pursuant to a pro-rata formula, which counsel presumed 
would be based on each plans' proportional primary liability 
coverage, is considerably more complicated than under the 
more traditional primary versus secondary scale. It may be 
that it was these difficulties that led the vast majority of 
states to adopt the NAIC recommended "employer-first" 
rule. 
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The district court also noted that the "employer-first" rule 
has been "incorporated into most self-insured employee 
benefit plans," McGurl, 925 F. Supp. at 292, and, in fact, 
the brief of the amici welfare funds confirms that their 
plans include such a provision. See infra note 5. 
Significantly, the Local 1262 Funds and the TENJ Fund 
themselves have adopted the Model Regulation "employer 
first" rule to govern employee/dependent conflicts with 
regard to coverage for their full-time employees, and thus 
the Local 1262 Funds only resist its applicability to their 
part-time employees. 
 
Moreover, the "employer first" rule validates the natural 
disposition of an employee to look to his or her own 
employer for health care benefits as a reward for his or her 
own labor. Most important, the rule also allows employers 
to predict with more accuracy the extent of their own 
potential liability because it is easier to calculate the 
number of a plan's own employee-participants for which it 
is responsible than the uncertain but likely greater number 
of those employees' dependents who will look to the plan for 
their primary coverage. 
 
The final objection by the Local 1262 Funds to the 
imposition of an "employer first" order of benefits 
determination rule is that the prospect of having to provide 
primary coverage to part-time plan participants might force 
them to discontinue providing welfare benefits altogether. 
They argue that this would undermine ERISA's goal of not 
deterring the creation of employee benefit plans. They cite 
Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d 
Cir. 1990), where we stated that "[h]aving made a 
fundamental decision not to require employers to provide 
any benefit plans, Congress was forced to balance its desire 
to regulate extant plans more extensively against the 
danger that increased regulation would deter employers 
from creating such plans." 
 
It is true, as we explained in Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 
1323, 1329 (3d Cir. 1991), that "[i]n enacting ERISA, 
Congress did not impose a duty on employers to provide 
health care and other benefits to their employees. Rather, 
the clear emphasis of the statute is to ensure the proper 
execution of the plans once established." See also Hlinka v. 
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Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1988). 
But it is merely speculation that if the Local 1262 Funds 
are obliged to provide primary coverage for part-time 
employees they will be unable to afford any coverage 
whatsoever. Nor is there a sound reason for giving the 
financial interests of the Local 1262 Funds priority over 
those of the TENJ Fund, which naturally faces similar 
concerns about managing the escalating health care costs 
for part-time employees.5 Moreover, these plans have been 
established by collective bargaining, and it is in that 
process that inclusion, vel non, will be decided. 
 
Thus, in weighing the interests served by ERISA against 
the negative effects generated by a rule that favors"always 
secondary" plans and thereby induces all plans to structure 
their benefits similarly, to the ultimate detriment of 
participants, we conclude that the balance is heavily in 
favor of the "employer first" rule. Over the long-run, a 
uniform "employer first" rule is actually more equitable 
since, assuming a generally even distribution of employees 
and dependents among various plans, plans such as those 
at issue here will tend to be primary half of the time and 
secondary half of the time. The "employer first" rule 
advances the goals of preserving "the financial integrity of 
qualified plans by shielding them from unanticipated 
claims," Auto Owners, 31 F.2d at 375, and preventing 
participants from being "deprived of compensation that they 
reasonably anticipate under the plan's purported coverage," 
Northeast, 764 F.2d at 163. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Indeed, the Amicus parties in this case, the Local 863 I.B.T. Welfare 
Fund and Laborers Locals 472/172 of the New Jersey Welfare Fund, 
ERISA-regulated plans with "employer first" coordination of benefits 
provisions, have come into conflict with the same Local 1262 Funds' 
always secondary clause and have had to pay several hundred thousand 
dollars in expenses for dependent-beneficiaries of their plans as a result 
of the Local 1262 Funds' refusal to accept primary responsibility. 
 





We thus conclude that in those instances where the 
plans have competing provisions with respect to persons 
covered by both plans, the "employer first" rule provides the 
most appropriate basis for apportioning liability under 
federal common law for self-insured benefit plans regulated 
by ERISA. We will affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
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